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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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On Capitol Hill

JCS Chairman Makes Annual Posture Report to Congress; Says Strategic Balance Has Shifted in Favor of Soviets

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to Congress March 9 on this Nation's present and projected military posture in relation to the major military threats which could confront it now and in the forseeable future.

Telling the House Armed Services Committee he intended to be as objective as possible, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer said that although it can be fatal to the national security to underestimate the strength of an opponent, one must also guard against overestimating his strength.

The Admiral said he doesn't believe the United States today is in a position of inferior military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but he does think the balance is "tenuous" in certain areas and consequently the U.S. cannot help but be concerned.

The problem, as he sees it, lies in the future. This is due to the long lead time in acquisition of modern weapon systems. What brings it all into focus, he said, is when one looks at what the Soviets have accomplished in enhancing their military power during the past decade and considers what they are capable of accomplishing in the next decade if they maintain their present momentum.

Of course, it has been obvious since the close of World War II (the beginning of the atomic age), that the major threat to the United States, and to mankind generally, is the threat of nuclear war, he indicated.

Global Posture

The U.S. has tried, together with its allies, to maintain a global military posture, Admiral Moorer said, which would deter those who might be tempted to use their military power against the U.S. or its vital interests. But deterrence, he said, which is essentially a communication by word and deed that creates in the mind of a potential enemy the thought that there can be no good pay-off from a military attack, has not always been successful in a local sense.

He pointed out, however, that there have been several global crisis situations since World War II—Berlin, Lebanon, Cuba—that have been abated without world conflict. Consequently, it can be said that the primary objective of U.S. deterrence has been met.

Admiral Moorer said it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. military posture must continue to be strong enough to meet enemy military confrontations when they emerge, or threats to the U.S. when they are clearly posed.

And, if deterrence fails at any level of potential conflict, then the U.S. must have the relative military strength across-the-board and the military flexibility to employ that strength as appropriate and necessary to ensure that the opponent cannot win and that a just peace can be restored.

Defense Program

He then turned to the details of this country's relative military posture and told the Committee that most of the U.S. force data used in his comparisons were drawn from the currently projected Five Year Defense Program. Foreign data, he said, had been derived from intelligence estimates.

Beginning with strategic forces, Admiral Moorer said their

(Continued On Page Two)

"Our comfortable lead has all but vanished and within the next five or six years we could actually find ourselves in a position of over-all strategic inferiority, certainly as far as numbers of offensive delivery vehicles and megatons, and air defense systems, are concerned."—Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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"sufficiency" must be of foremost concern. Here are excerpts from the report:

—From a position of predominant superiority in the early to mid-1960s, the U.S. has now fallen distinctly behind the Soviets in total numbers of operational Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) launchers. At the end of 1970, the U.S. had 1,054 and the Soviets 1,440, including a number of SS-11 Variable Range Ballistic Missiles (VRBMs) deployed in the MR/IRBM complexes. By mid-1971 it is expected the Soviet ICBM forces will reach a total of about 1,500 operational launchers.

—Recent U.S. intelligence reveals the initiation by the Soviets of a new ICBM silo construction program. The new silos are unlike any other which the Soviets have previously constructed, and the U.S. does not know what these silos are intended for or how many will be built.

—The deployment of SS-11 launchers appears to have leveled off at the present time. The deployment of the SS-13 continues as it has for the past four years, with some indication that it may be slowing down.

(Admiral Moorer noted, however, that the Soviets are continuing an active test program for improving both the SS-11 and the SS-13.)

U.S. Lead

He said that although the U.S. still has a substantial quantitative as well as qualitative lead over the Soviets in the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) area, they are expected to overtake the U.S. at least in the total number of operational SLBMs by the mid-1970s.

In regard to the U.S. SLBM force, Admiral Moorer said the U.S. plans to retain all 41 Polaris submarines through mid-1976 and convert 31 of them to the Poseidon. "Thus," he said, "we will continue to have a total of 656 operational SLBMs."

On the Soviet side of the ledger, he reported that the Soviets are now building "Y" class nuclear-powered submarines at a rate of about eight a year. This submarine carries 16 submerged-launched missiles which have an estimated range of 1,300 nautical miles.

By mid-1971, the Soviets are expected to have more than 30 "Y" class submarines operational. In addition, the Soviets have "G" class diesel-powered and "H" class nuclear-powered submarines carrying submerged-launched 650 nautical mile range SLBMs.

The Chairman of the JCS added that the U.S. Polaris A-2 will be phased out of the force as the Poseidon program progresses, leaving 160 Polaris A-3s plus the 496 Poseidon SLBMs. The new Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS), now under development, could be available for deployment in the late 1970s or early 1980s.

Delivery Vehicles

Of interest in the overall picture, however, are the trends in total U.S. and Soviet intercontinental delivery vehicles. This includes ICBM launchers, SLBM tubes and strategic bombers. Admiral Moorer said there were three general measures customarily used in summarizing the over-all strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

"These," he said, "are numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and numbers of warheads."

He cautioned, however, that no one of these measures, alone, provides a valid comparison; all three must be used in an appropriate combination, together with other factors such as accuracy, range, and ability to carry penetration aids.

A chart on page seven compares the total numbers of U.S. and Soviet intercontinental strategic offensive delivery vehicles through mid-1971.

Admiral Moorer said it is estimated that the Soviets could come abreast of the U.S. in this measure of the strategic balance within the next year or two, and will most likely exceed the U.S. by mid-1970s.

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'Regardless of All-Volunteer Force Goal'

Pentagon's Manpower Chief Urges Adoption of Military Proposals

The Administration's proposed changes to improve pay, living and working conditions of military personnel "should be made whether they achieve our goal of an All-Volunteer Force or not," the Pentagon's chief manpower spokesman told an Iowa civic group recently.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Roger T. Kelley, speaking before a gathering of the Quad-City Rotary Clubs at Davenport, March 11, said "Improvements in Service life are long overdue even if we were to continue the draft indefinitely.

"In simple justice," he asserted, "those in the Armed Forces are entitled to higher pay and better living conditions than they now enjoy."

In his talk, Mr. Kelley noted that, after drafting men for military service for more than 30 years, the Nation is now trying to return to a military force made up entirely of volunteers.

"It will not be easy," he said. "In the days when our country had an All-Volunteer Force, our military forces were small. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, the average strength of the Armed Forces was less than 300,000. In those days, too, military technology was simpler, and the need for high levels of skill and learning was far less than it is today."

Problems Ahead

"These two facts," he continued, "suggest some of the problems that lie ahead as we seek to dispense with the draft. We shall have to maintain a force of two million members or more. And, we shall have to include in this force, people with a broad assortment of special talents and skills required for the performance of the tasks in the military force of the 1970s.

"The problem of attaining an All-Volunteer Force, then, is one of both the quantity and the quality of manpower... The quality aspect of the problem receives too little attention in public discussion of the subject ... Many positions in today's military forces require talent, knowledge, and skill, and we cannot be indifferent about the quality of military personnel."

Mr. Kelley said he preferred a volunteer force to one raised in part by conscription. ". . . The individual should have the widest possible range of free choice in ordering his life, in determining his career, in deciding how to employ his talents."

Careful Study

Following careful and objective studies toward achieving an All-Volunteer Force —studies that began more than two years ago—Mr. Kelley said that he had reached several conclusions:

—In the adult work world, the Armed Forces (like other organizations) function best in a free environment where they compete with others for people.

—An organization composed of volunteers, having survived the test of free competition, tends to be more efficient than one that relies on forced entry.

—The alleged pitfalls of the voluntary military organization—that it will be dominated by mercenaries who will take over our Nation, or be all black—are gratuitous and false claims. They should be knocked down hard, lest the American public be misled by them.

—Once the transition to an All-Volunteer Force has been accomplished, the military organization will be totally more effective and will consist of many fewer people than its conscripted counterpart.

The Assistant Secretary said, if his conclusions were correct, "then eliminating the draft is desirable for reasons other than just begetting an All-Volunteer Force . . . above all else, it would provide better national security . . . It would be less costly and would serve the morale and esprit of its people far more effectively than the compulsory form of organization."

Noting that the target date for reducing draft calls to zero has been set for July 1, 1973, Mr. Kelley said that the size of draft calls has been cut already. "Last year, 163,500 men were drafted—about one-half the number drafted two year earlier." He attributed the lower draft calls to the success of the Vietnamization program.

Hard Part Ahead

He asserted that the hardest part of the job lies ahead, "as we approach the level of manpower at which we shall stabilize for the post-Vietnam period," and added that we need to continue drafting some men for two more years, the length of time President Nixon has asked the Congress to extend the Selective Service System. "It will take at least this long," Mr. Kelley said, "to put into effect a number of changes to swell the ranks of volunteers for the Armed Forces, and so end reliance on the draft."

He then outlined the proposed changes, touching briefly on pay raises, improved housing conditions, educational opportunities, introduction of a modicum comfort into barracks life, elimination of unnecessary onerous and demeaning practices, enlistment bonuses for combat skill volunteers, and increased pay and allowances for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets.

The pay proposal, he said, calls for substantial pay raises in the low enlisted and officer ranks. "Present pay levels keep people from enlisting in the Armed Forces who would otherwise volunteer." He compared the basic pay of a private, just graduating from basic training and adjusted for the value of quarters, subsistence and tax advantage—worth about $2,700 per year—against the $1.60 per hour Federal minimum wage, totaling $3,300 per year. He also cited the annual pay of a new Job Corps graduate as $3,900, unskilled blue collar beginner's pay as $6,000, and the starting salary of a New York City policeman as $9,500.

"As long as we underpay those in the Armed Forces," he emphasized, "we are in effect demanding that they subsidize the rest of the Nation by providing their labor at rates far below those which they would receive in other occupations.

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'. . . Improvements in Service life are long overdue. . . . In simple justice, the Armed Forces are entitled to higher pay and better living conditions. . . .'

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It is enough that we ask them to risk their lives for us. We should not continue to pay them substandard wages for their services."

Desirable Goal

Mr. Kelley said: "The Nixon Administration believes that an All-Volunteer Force is both an attainable and a desirable goal. There are, to be sure, critics of the All-Volunteer Force who say that such a force would be made up predominantly of the poor and of blacks. In its most demagogic form, this objection is stated in the words 'poor boys would have to fight rich men's wars'."

"Those who make these claims," he went on, "never support them with evidence or facts. Such experience as we have had does not confirm them. The racial composition of those with more than four years of service, all of whom are volunteers, includes 12.5 per cent who are black. That percentage is within one per cent of blacks in the Nation-at-large for the age group from which the great majority of servicemen are drawn—hardly an indication that a volunteer force would be dominated by blacks.

"It is difficult," he said, "to predict how various income levels would be reflected in an All-Volunteer Force. But what disturbs me most about the argument that an All-Volunteer Force will be composed overwhelmingly of poor boys is the snobbery implicit in it. There will be minimum standards for admission to the Armed Forces—mental, physical and moral. We shouldn't add to these any standard in terms of the net worth of a volunteer. It should be recognized that military service for some young men offers an escape from poverty. I do not think this escape should be closed—provided they meet the standards for admission to the Armed Forces."

Reservists' Role

The Assistant Secretary then discussed the role of Reserve and National Guard forces within the over-all All-Volunteer Force concept, saying that they must assume increased responsibility for national security. "Reserve elements will be called to active duty before turning to the draft for military manpower . . . To make these National Guard and Reserve units capable of meeting their responsibilities a substantial investment is being made to improve National Guard and Reserve equipment . . . badly depleted during the Vietnam buildup of the Active forces.

"As we move toward an All-Volunteer Force," Mr. Kelley said, "it will be necessary to stimulate more enlistments in the National Guard and Reserves. Our studies indicate that three-fourths of the enlistees in the Reserve components in recent years have been motivated by the draft. With this motivation gone, the National Guard and Reserves must have their own attraction power."

He observed that there was a "need for the employers of our Nation to understand the role of the National Guard and the Reserve, and their obligation as employers to encourage National Guard and Reserve participation by their employes. It is discouraging to be confronted by a company policy which, in essence, says, 'You can belong to the National Guard and Reserve as long as it doesn't interfere with your job here.' That is apt to mean using one's annual vacation for a two-week encampment, which over a period time is no way to sustain a happy family life. . . . At the very least, an individual's job and promotion opportunities should not be curtailed by his willingness to serve the needs of national security through National Guard and Reserve participation."

Lowest Level

Important changes are also taking place in our national budgetary priorities, Mr. Kelley pointed out. "Defense spending, in relation to the Gross National Product and to total Federal spending, is at the lowest level since 1950.

HAPPY MOMENT. Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee, center, talks with Captain Alan B. Shepard, Jr., left, and Captain Edgar D. Mitchell after presenting the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal to the two Navy members of the Apollo 14 moon flight. Mr. Chafee made the presentation March 12 in his office in the Pentagon. **(DEFENSE PHOTO by PHC Thomas J. Mackesy, USN)**

The number of military and civilian employes of the Department of Defense is now back down close to the levels that preceded the Vietnam buildup," and, "in another year, they will be far below those levels."

However, Mr. Kelley explained, "despite reductions of 1.2 million military and civilian employes between 1968 and 1972, the people-related expenditures of the Department will rise in this period from $32.6 billion to $39.6 billion." He said that "52 per cent of Defense spending next year will be 'people' costs."

"It is important, then," he continued, "that the Defense Department get the most out of its people. From the economic point of view, manpower and personnel policies which hold down these burgeoning costs are imperative. He added that he was in favor of an All-Volunteer Force in part because he was convinced that "such a force will produce more defense for the dollar."

Mr. Kelley said that there was one additional observation about the conditions precedent to the establishment of an all-volunteer military force: public recognition that military service is a worthy career.

Need for Respect

"The military profession," he said, "does not enjoy the respect and the esteem that it deserves. . . . The abusive defamation of the military that circulates in many quarters of our society is increasingly an obstacle to recruitment and retention of personnel by the Armed Forces.

"It is not only unjust," he asserted, "it is dangerous to our Nation's security. If the military profession is not accorded the respect it deserves, no amount of money, no improvement in the conditions of service life, no recruitment campaign, will attract enough qualified volunteers to maintain an adequate military force.

"In the past two years," Mr. Kelley concluded, "we have seen dramatic progress away from war in the direction of that generation of peace which the President has announced as his objective for the Nation. One important milestone on our journey toward peace will be reached when we cease to draft young men into the Armed Forces. That goal is not far off—if the program which we have mapped to achieve it receives the support of the Congress and the people of the Nation."

Equal Opportunity Education Program Established

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, in a continuing effort to improve equal opportunity within the Department of Defense in keeping with the human goals program he proclaimed August 18, 1969, has announced the establishment of an Education Program in Race Relations for all members of the Armed Forces.

The primary purpose of the program, developed by the Department of Defense Inter-Service Task Force on Education in Race Relations, is to achieve a more harmonious relationship among all military personnel, so that organizational efficiency and combat readiness will not be impaired by racial unrest, tension or conflict.

To implement the program, a Defense Race Relations Education Board has been formed and a Defense Race Relations Institute is expected to become operational in the near future at a site yet to be chosen.

The Race Relations Education Board will be under the cognizance of Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The Board will prescribe policy guidance for the program and will serve as an advisory group to the Secretary of Defense.

The Board's standing membership will consist of Assistant Secretary Kelley, representatives from the offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Equal Opportunity and Education) and the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of the Military Departments.

The Defense Race Relations Institute will be a field agency of the Department of Defense. The Institute will train Armed Forces personnel as instructors in race relations, develop doctrine and curricula for the education program, conduct research, perform an evaluation of the program's effectiveness, and disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization throughout the Armed Forces.

NATION'S FIRST—Second Lieutenant Janes Leslie Holley, left, chats with Colonel Jeanne M. Holm, Director of WAF, prior to receiving her commission as the first woman graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. Lt. Holley was commissioned March 17 at Auburn University, Alabama. There are more than 500 women presently enrolled in AFROTC training. (U.S. Air Force Photo)

JCS Chairman Makes Annual Posture Report to Congress

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A sharp decline in U.S. megatons from 1966 to 1970 reflects, for the most part, a reduction in the number of heavy bombers and the substitution of smaller yield for higher yield bombs. Only in numbers of strategic offensive warheads is the U.S. likely to maintain its lead over the Soviet Union during the 1970s.

Soviet Potential

But even here, the Admiral said, the Soviets have the potential to overtake the U.S. eventually since their missile forces have considerably greater "throw weight" or payload capacity than U.S. missile forces.

Admiral Moorer said he believed it fair to say that the over-all strategic balance, during the last five or six years, has drastically shifted in favor of the Soviet Union.

"Our comfortable lead has all but vanished," he continued, "and within the next five or six years we could actually find ourselves in a position of over-all strategic inferiority, certainly as far as numbers of offensive delivery vehicles and megatons, and air defense systems, are concerned."

Turning to general purpose forces—the United States versus the Soviet Union, and NATO versus the Warsaw Pact, Admiral Moorer made the following remarks:

"These are the general purpose force comparisons of most significance to our national security and to our position in the world.

"The United States and the Soviet Union are the two great superpowers in the world today. Each is the kingpin in a major formal military alliance—the U.S. in NATO and the Soviets in the Warsaw Pact.

Looser Alignment

"And, each is the power center of an even broader but looser alignment of nations—the U.S. in the Free World and the Soviets in the Communist sphere of influence. Therefore, the over-all balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union exerts an enormous influence on the actions of other nations, their alignments and sense of security, and thus on the stability of the entire world order."

For this reason, a comparison of U. S. and Soviet general purpose forces is very useful, Admiral Moorer said, in rounding out U.S. understanding of that over-all balance of military power.

He explained: "Within this world order, the fate of Western Europe is of crucial importance to our own security. Should the Soviets (or any other nation antagonistic to our national interest) ever gain control of Western Europe, the balance of world power could be irrevocably turned against us. Thus, the deterrence of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, at any level of conflict, is a very high priority in our military planning."

In examining the total military assets available to the two alliances, Admiral Moorer explained that to achieve a greater degree of comparability, the Soviet figures had to be adjusted by excluding strategic (homeland) air defense and strategic rocket troops, and by including naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket troop.

U.S. Figures

The U.S. figures have been adjusted by excluding Army strategic (Continental) air defense and Marine Corps tactical air personnel.

To begin with, the Soviets are expected to have about 2.1 million active duty personnel in their land forces at mid-1971, compared with about 1.25 million personnel in the U.S. land forces. That comparison shows the Soviet land forces, in terms of military personnel on active duty, to be considerably larger than that of the U.S.

The Soviets, he said, have a ground force Reserve of about two million men who have been on active military duty within the past five years. The U.S. Reserve is about 2.25 million men, of which about 700,000 are in organized units.

The United States' standards of combat readiness are much higher than those of the Soviet Union; at least the U.S. takes considerably more time to ready its forces for combat than the Soviets, he said.

Another facet shows the entire Soviet division structure included in the active forces; the Reservists are called up as individuals or small units to fill out that structure. The U.S. division structure is divided between the Active and Reserve forces; the Reservists are called up both in major units (i.e., divisions and brigades) and as individuals.

Land Inventories

Turning to U.S. and Soviet major land forces weapons inventories, Admiral Moorer said it was difficult to make accurate



comparisons because there are times when it is not entirely agreed which combat vehicles should be included in the tank category and which in the armored personnel carrier category.

Nevertheless, he said, even allowing for a sizeable margin of error in estimates, "it is quite clear that the Soviet inventories of tanks, artillery tubes, armored personnel carriers and other fighting vehicles are considerably greater than ours."

He said the U.S. and Soviet inventories are probably much closer together with regard to medium and heavy crew-served anti-tank weapons and surface-to-surface missiles.

Concerning helicopters, he said there is no question but that the U.S. has several times more "choppers" than the Soviet Union, regardless of which particular kinds of helicopters are included in this category.

Comparing tactical aircraft, Admiral Moorer said the figures included tactical fighter, attack and reconnaissance for both the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Inventory Will Decline

From a peak of about 5,600 tactical aircraft in 1969, the U.S. inventory will decline to about 4,600 in 1971, he said. The Soviet inventory, he said, rose from 1967 to 1970, and is projected to decline in the next several years. As in the case of the U.S., the decline in the projected Soviet aircraft inventory reflects the introduction of newer and more capable aircraft on a less than one-for-one basis.

He said the Soviets also have more than 1,500 combat-type tactical aircraft used for training. Moreover, some of the Soviet interceptors counted in the strategic defense forces could be diverted to tactical use in the air superiority role, if urgently needed.

With regard to the near-term future, the newest U.S. fighters, the Navy's F-14 and the Air Force's F-15, are expected to be distinctly superior to any tactical aircraft the Soviets are likely to deploy within the next five or six years, he asserted.

TRENDS IN US AND SOVIET



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

Discussing naval general purpose forces, Admiral Moorer said the U.S. has made the choice in favor of a smaller, but more modern, fleet. The number of U.S. combat surface ships has already been reduced from a Vietnam build-up peak of 326 in mid-1968, to a planned level of 245 for mid-1971. The force will be reduced further by mid-1973 and then held at a steady level through 1976, with new ships replacing the old, he said.

Expanding Size

The Soviet deepwater fleet, over the past decade, has been steadily expanding in size and capability. They are expected to have some 217 operational combat surface ships by the middle of 1971, and this number will probably increase through the 1970s.

Admiral Moorer brought up a pertinent point regarding the relative strength of U.S. and Soviet naval power. Here is how he explained it:

". . . we must bear in mind that the objectives of the two forces are by no means parallel. U.S. Navy general purpose forces have been designed to control the sea lines of communications and to project our sea power across the oceans. The Soviet Navy general purpose forces have been designed primarily to defeat these U.S. goals.

"Thus," he continued, "the U.S. Navy general purpose forces are built around the attack carriers and the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team, which together provide the principal means for projecting our sea power across the oceans; and around the ASW forces, which provide the principal means for pro-

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

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tecting our sea lines of communication from attack by submarines.

"The Soviet Navy general purpose forces, in contrast, are built around their attack submarines (including cruise missile submarines), their surface ships armed with ship-to-ship missiles, and their land-based naval bombers all designed to attack our carrier forces and disrupt our sea lines of communication."

Capacity to Attack

He said the Soviets still cannot match U.S. capabilities to project sea power and control the sea lines of communication. But they already have a formidable capacity to attack U.S. sea power projection forces—which depend upon reasonably secure sea lines of communication—and to disrupt the sea lines of communication, themselves.

"The continuing growth in this Soviet capacity is a matter of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," he said, adding, "No longer is the Soviet Navy just a coastal defense force. They are now operating on a sustained basis in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and periodically as far abroad as the Caribbean.

"Unless we accelerate the modernization of our fleet," he cautioned, "the Soviets may soon be able to challenge our control of the seas, at least in those regions of the world closer to their shores."

U.S. Army Europe C-in-C Awarded French Legion of Honor, Commander's Rank

General James H. Polk, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Army, Europe, and Central Army Group, was awarded the rank of Commander in the French Legion of Honor, March 13, joining a select few U.S. military and civilian personalities to receive the award.

Gen. Polk, who will retire April 1, was presented the "Cravate de Commandeur de la Legion d'Honneur, by General Emmanuel Hublot, Commanding General of the First French Army.

In accepting the medal, Gen. Polk said, "I am deeply honored to receive this award. I receive it not as an individual, but as a representative of the United States Army, in behalf of all who have served and will serve."

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Editor John R. German

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Gen. Hublot, left, congratulates Gen. Polk after he had conferred France's highest State award upon the American general. Assisting in the ceremony is Captain Guy Marie Fournier-Montgieux, Gen. Hublot's Aide de Camp.

(U.S. ARMY PHOTO)

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